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COMMENT 





In response to major corporate scandals such as Enron's in 2001,1 
government investigation of corporate misconduct has become 
increasingly proactive.2 Corporations that cooperate with government 
agencies and willingly "clean house" following suspected or actual 
illegal activity may be rewarded with reduced penalties under sentencing 
I See generally John R. Kroger, Enron. Fraud. and Securities Reform: An Enron 
Prosecutor's Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REv. 57, 58-60 (2005) ("When Enron went bankrupt on 
December 2, 200 I, after stunning revelations about the company's insider deals and faulty 
accounting, some 4,500 Enron workers had lost their jobs in Houston alone. Enron's employees, 
who had been encouraged to place their retirement savings in Enron stock, lost some $1.3 billion in 
401(k) accounts. Nationwide, Enron's countless investors, who had seen the stock price decline 
over the course of the year from eighty-four dollars to mere pennies per share, lost some $61 billion. 
This disaster occurred largely because ofa troubling gap between perception and reality."). 
2 Claudius O. Sokenu, The Current Enforcement Environment and the Corporate Response, 
Practising Law Institute, 1617 PLUCoRP 331, 333 (2007). For example, in 2002, President Bush 
established a Corporate Fraud Task Force to oversee all corporate fraud matters under investigation 
by the DOJ and to coordinate with federal regulatory agencies towards civil enforcement. Second 
Year Report to the President. Corporate Fraud Task Force, Practising Law Institute, 1492 PLl/CoRP 
543, 552 (2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/2nd-yr_fraud_report.pdf at 1.2. From 
the Task Force's inception through May of 2004, the DOJ charged over 900 defendants and over 60 
corporate CEOs and presidents with some type of corporate fraud crime in connection with over 400 
filed cases. [d. at 558. This was up from corporate fraud charges pending against 354 defendants in 
connection with 169 filed cases in May of 2003. First Year Report to the President. Corporate 
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guidelines if indicted,3 deferred indictment, or no indictment at al1.4 At 
least since the 1999 publication of the Department of Justice's 
(hereinafter "DOJ") charging policies for business organizations,5 
prosecutors have consistently considered a corporation's waiver of its 
attorney-client privilege as an element of cooperation and regularly 
request that corporations tum over documents - sometimes privileged 
documents - that are relevant to the investigation.6 
The DOl's policy of treating waiver of the attorney-client privilege 
as an element of cooperation (hereinafter "waiver policy," which is part 
of the DOl's charging policy) is controversial and one of the most widely 
discussed aspects of governmental efforts to investigate and prosecute 
corporate crime.7 Commentators and critics commonly make the 
conclusory statement that the government coerces corporations into 
waiving their attorney-client privileges.8 In fact, in 2006, the National 
3 In its 2006 annual report, the U.S. Sentencing Commission reported that II I of the 217 
organizations had detailed culpability score information that either increased or decreased the fines 
calculated at sentencing. Of the III cases, not one received a reduction in its culpability score for 
having in place an effective compliance and ethics program, but eighty-seven (78.3%) organizations 
received reductions for either self-reporting, cooperating, or accepting responsibility. Fifty-four 
organizations (48.6%) received reductions for cooperating with the government investigation. 
United States Sentencing Comm'n 2006 Annual Report, at 41 (2006), 
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2006/chap5_06.pdf. 
4 Claudius O. Sokenu, The Current Enforcement Environment and the Corporate Response, 
Practising Law Institute, 1617 PLIICoRP 331, 333, 355-56 (2007). 
5 Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy AU'y Gen., United States Dep't of Justice, Bringing Criminal 
Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), I White Collar Crime § 3:49 (2d ed.), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud!docs/reports/1999/chargingcorps.html. 
6 Kenneth S. Broun & Daniel 1. Capra, Getting Control of Waiver of Privilege in the 
Federal Courts: A Proposal For a Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 58 S.C. L. REv. 211, 215-16 
(2006). 
7 Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective Cooperation by Business Organizations and the Impact of 
Privilege Waivers, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 587, 588 (2004) (U.S. Attorney Mary Beth Buchanan 
addresses how privilege waivers impact the DOl's assessment of cooperation, and addresses 
common criticisms of the DOJ policy, finding that the benefits of cooperation outweigh perceived 
problems of waiver of the attorney-client privilege). 
8 See. e.g., Adam Aldrich, Comment, In re Qwest Communications International: Does 
Selective Waiver Exist for Materials Disclosed During a Government Investigation?, 84 DENV. U. L. 
REv. 809, 826 (Sept. 2005-Sept. 2006) ("The SEC and DOJ are the ones coercing corporations to 
waive [the privilege's] protections 'or else,' .... "); Jack King, NACDL, Chamber Of Commerce, 
ACLU. ABA, Corporate Counsel Ally in Support of Attorney-Client Privilege, 29-DEC CHAMPION 
8, 10 (2005) ("Section 8C2.5 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ... allows the government to 
coerce an organization to waive attorney-client privilege to show "thorough" cooperation and thus 
qualify for a reduced sentence."); Colin P. Marks, Corporate Investigations, Attorney-Client 
Privilege, and Selective Waiver: Is a Half-Privilege Worth Having at All?, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 
155, 156 (2006) ("[This article] concludes that selective waiver is inadequate in addressing the many 
problems created by policies that coerce waiver and that a more desirable solution is to eliminate or 
amend the governmental policies that coerce waiver."); Robert G. Morvillo, The Decline of the 
Attorney-Client Privilege, 12/2/97 N.Y. LJ. 3, col.l (1997) ("The office of the United States 
2
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Association of Corporate Defense Lawyers ("NACDL") officially 
declared in its Statement on Corporate Attorney Client Privilege that the 
waiver policy necessarily coerces waivers of the attorney-client 
privilege.9 However, these statements are not supported by an analysis 
of the waiver policy under the various legal standards for coerced 
waivers.JO 
A coerced waiver is involuntary and therefore invalid. II Thus, any 
privileged information a corporation discloses to government 
investigators pursuant to a coerced waiver would remain protected by the 
privilege and would not be discoverable by plaintiffs in subsequent civil 
actions. 12 Indeed, in 2007, several corporations successfully argued that 
the government had coerced them into waiving their attorney-client 
privileges by threatening indictment that, they alleged, would necessarily 
lead to corporate death.13 The California Court of Appeal of the Fourth 
Appellate District found that the risk of significant costs and 
consequences associated with indictment coerced the corporations into 
Attorney for the Southern District of New York routinely coerces corporate waivers of the privilege 
by infonning corporate managers that their failure to waive the privilege will be evaluated in 
detennining whether the corporation has been sufficiently cooperative to avoid indictment and/or a 
severe guidelines sentence."). 
9 NACDL Statement on Attorney-Client Privilege, National Association of Corporate 
Defense Lawyers (2006), available at 
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsflWhiteCollar/WCnews024/$FILE/Privilege_Statement06.pdf 
("NACDL believes that in a climate created by the current practices of the Department of Justice, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the United States Sentencing Commission, and other 
agencies, the waiver of privilege is necessarily coerced and therefore not a voluntary waiver. "). 
10 There are various common-law tests courts use to detennine whether coercion has 
occurred. Generally, the tests detennine whether the waiver resulted from a free and rational choice. 
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 175-76 (1981); 86 C.J.S. Threats § 32 (2007); 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5 (200 I). 
II A waiver must be given voluntarily. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169 (1986) 
("Of course, a waiver must at a minimum be 'voluntary' to be effective against an accused.") 
(citation omitted); CAL. EVID. CODE § 912(a) (Westlaw 2008) (waiver occurs when "the holder of 
the privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has 
consented to disclosure made by anyone") (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
12 See In re ColumbialHCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 294 (6th 
Cir. 2002) ("As a general rule, the attorney-client privilege is waived by voluntary disclosure of 
private communications by an individual or corporation to third parties. . .. The prevailing view is 
that once a client waives the privilege to one party, the privilege is waived en toto.") (emphasis 
added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); X Corp. v. Doe, 805 F. Supp. 1298, 1306 
(E.D. Va. 1992) ("Moreover, voluntary disclosure by the client to a third party waives the privilege 
as to both the specific communication and all other communications relating to the same subject 
matter.") (emphasis added). 
13 In re Natural Gas Anti-Trust Cases, JCCP 4221, 4224, 4226, 4428 San Diego Super. Ct., 
Tentative Ruling, Independent Plaintiff's McKesson Issue (June 12, 2007), available at 
http://www.sdcourt.ca.gov/pls/portalldocsIPAGE/SDCOURT/CIVILlJCCP/JCCPCASE2754IMfNU 
TESORDERS/T AB 146924/MCKESSON-RULfNG%205-14-07.PDF. 
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cooperating with the government. 14 As a result, the corporations 
managed to protect documents they had disclosed to the government 
from civil discovery.15 
The difficult choice many corporations face - waive the attorney-
client privilege to avoid possible indictment and thereby make the 
privileged materials available to third parties in civil suits, or assert the 
privilege and thereby increase the risk of indictment - does not rise to the 
level of coercion. As a general policy, coercion - like extortion and 
duress - requires some wrongful threat or undue influence that causes a 
victim's "choice" to be involuntary.16 Corporations face only the 
"threat" of the reputational consequences that flow naturally from an 
indictment, and these are the same type of consequences any criminal 
defendant faces. 17 No matter how dire those consequences may be, they 
are not wrongfully compelled by prosecutors. 
To accept that the DOJ's charging policy is sufficient to coerce a 
waiver, without any wrongful act by the DOJ, brings into question every 
settlement or plea bargain made in which one party has a strong incentive 
to avoid going to trial, such as risk of capital punishment or risk of a civil 
award that could cause a defendant to go bankrupt. 18 Furthermore, 
finding the DOJ's policy coercive may ultimately increase corporate 
14 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Super. Ct. of San Diego County, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 186,188 
(Ct. App. 2008). 
15 !d. at 188-89. The court drew upon California law, which protects privileged information 
from inadvertent disclosures, noting, "[TJhe holder of the privilege need only take 'reasonable steps' 
to protect privileged communications. No case has required that the holder of a privilege take 
extraordinary or heroic measures to preserve the confidentiality of such communications." fd. 
However, a corporation does not choose to disclose privileged information when the disclosure is 
inadvertent. Nor, as the court noted, does it choose to disclose privileged information when 
compelled to do so by a court order. At issue in this case was a circumstance in which a corporation 
consciously disclosed privileged information to government agents without legal compulsion to do 
so. This circumstance requires an analysis distinct from situations in which an individual does not 
actually consent to the disclosure. An absence of such analysis weakened the court's additional 
reliance on two Ohio district court trade cases from the 1950's that opine that government requests 
for information are implicitly coercive. See id. at 192. This is especially true in light of the Sixth 
Circuit's position that a corporation cannot selectively waive the attorney-client privilege by 
releasing otherwise privileged documents to government agencies during an investigation, and then 
continue to assert privilege as to other parties. See In re ColumbialHCA Healthcare Corp. Billing 
Practices Litig. 293 F.3d 289, 302-04 (2002). 
16 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 175-76 (1981); 86 C.J.S. Threats § 
32 (2007); MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5 (2001). 
17 See Peter Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate Crime, Advancement oj Executives' 
DeJense Costs, and the Federal Courts (part II), 7 U.c. DAVIS BuS. L.J. 2 (2006), available at 
http://blj.ucdavis.eduJarticle.asp?id~650 ("Unless the Constitution is read to bar all indictments that 
have adverse collateral impacts on defendants, the prospect of an indictment for a business 
organization should have no greater significance under the Constitution than the indictment of any 
other person or entity."). 
18 See id. 
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indictments. If the DO] cannot access enough infonnation to detennine 
that a corporation has remediated any wrongdoing by its employees or 
has fully complied with the law (e.g., through waiver of the attorney-
client privilege when there is a "legitimate need"),19 then it will be more 
likely to indict the corporation.20 Finally, a finding of coercion 
ultimately allows corporations to selectively waive the privilege to 
benefit from cooperating with the government, and then assert the 
privilege as a shield against civil opponents. Such selective waivers go 
against the public policy behind the privilege and have been rejected by 
all but one federal circuit and a California court of appeal. 21 As long as 
corporations knowingly and intelligently waive their attorney-client 
privileges for purposes of obtaining a benefit from the government, the 
mere threat of indictment without any wrongful act on the part of the 
prosecutor or impennissible curtailment of a constitutional right does not 
coerce the waiver. 
Part I of this comment explains the attorney-client privilege and the 
waiver doctrine and demonstrates the important role the privilege plays 
in our legal system. It shows why, according to the DO] charging policy, 
waiver of the privilege is often needed during corporate investigations. It 
also addresses how the charging policy erodes the privilege in the 
corporate context, thereby creating governance problems for 
19 Memorandum of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., United States Dep't of Justice, 
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (2003) at 8-9, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf. 
20 By fully cooperating, a corporation literally shows the government that it is a "good 
corporate citizen" by fully disclosing any wrongdoing and taking steps to remediate. Without this 
full disclosure the government cannot know if indictment is unnecessary. See Michael A. Simons, 
Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and "Good Corporate Citizenship, " 76 ST. JOHN'S L. 
REV. 979, 995 (2002) ("[PJrosecutors put such great weight on cooperation that it can often save a 
corporation from indictment even if the corporation lacked a meaningful compliance program, even 
if top management knew about the criminal activity, and even if top management was involved in 
the criminal activity .... "). Full cooperation, however, is not a simple matter for management, and 
will likely raise ethical concerns regarding the disclosure of information about employee 
communications. See John Hasnas, Department of Coercion, WALL ST. J., Mar. II, 2006, at A9, 
available at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5974 ("For example, most corporations 
solicit sensitive information from their employees by promising to keep communications ... 
confidential. But whenever such communications suggest[] possible criminal activity within the 
firm, the corporation must disclose it to the government or risk indictment and increased fines. The 
responsible manager must then choose between protecting the corporation and reducing its promise 
of confidentiality to a fraud."). 
21 In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, 450 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2006) (declining to adopt 
selective waiver: "Our review of the opinions of other circuits, however, indicates there is almost 
unanimous rejection of selective waiver. Only the Eighth Circuit has adopted selective waiver in 
circumstances applicable to Qwesl."); see McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 812, 
821 (Ct. App. 2004) ("Given the Legislature's expressed desire to control evidentiary privileges and 
protections, adoption of the selective waiver theory should come from that body."). 
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corporations. Part II provides legal definitions and standards for coerced 
waivers to show that the choice corporations must make between 
waiving the privilege or increasing their risk of indictment does not meet 
any legal test for coercion. Part III concludes that although the waiver 
policy is problematic, it does not legally coerce corporations into 
compliance. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest recognized 
privileges known to common law. 22 It dates back to ancient Rome23 and 
is one that our judicial system has carefully protected with only a few 
specific exceptions.24 In spite of its long history, the attorney-client 
privilege does not have constitutional protection.25 Like other 
testimonial privileges, which keep truthful evidence from fact-finders,26 
the attorney-client privilege is disfavored by courts, which apply it 
narrowly and often resolve doubts in favor of disclosure.27 
22 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
23 Colin P. Marks, Corporate Investigations, Attorney-Client Privilege, and Selective 
Waiver: Is a Half-Privilege Worth Having at All?, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 155, 157 (2006). 
24 People v. Gurule, 51 P.2d 224, 250 (Cal. 2002); see Royal Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. 
Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 505, 509 (W.O. Tenn. 1999) (,The attorney-client privilege 
is a hallowed principle of Anglo-American law .... Nevertheless ... the privilege is not absolute, 
and in some situations, society's interest in preventing ongoing illegal conduct outweighs its interest 
in protecting confidential communications. "). 
25 OKC Corp. v. Williams, 461 F. Supp. 540, 546 (N.D. Tex. 1978) ("[T]he attorney-client 
privilege. .. is not a principle of constitutional proportions but a rule of evidence. While 
unquestionably valued and significant, the attorney-client privilege has not been elevated to the 
stature of a constitutional right."). 
26 Testimonial privileges protect certain individuals from being forced to disclose 
confidential communications that occurred under specific circumstances. The purpose of testimonial 
privileges is to promote relationships that society values, such as husband and wife (marital 
privilege), doctor and patient (doctor-patient privilege), attorney and client (attorney-client 
privilege), and clergy and penitent (penitent privilege). See I Federal Evidence § I :26 (3d ed.). 
27 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) ("[Testimonial privileges] must be 
strictly construed and accepted 'only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or 
excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of 
utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.''') (citation omitted); United States v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683, 710 (1974) ("[T]hese exceptions to the demand for everyman's evidence are not lightly 
created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for the truth."). Contra 
United States v. Mett, 178 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir.1999) ("[W]here the attorney-client privilege is 
concerned, hard cases should be resolved in favor of the privilege, not in favor of disclosure .... 
'[A]n uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying 
applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all."') (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United 
States, 449 U.S. at 393) (rejecting plaintiff's assertion that the fiduciary exception to the attorney-
client privilege should be read expansively to include any information relating to the fiduciary 
relationship, even when the fiduciary seeks legal advice relating to personal liability arising from the 
fiduciary relationship). 
6
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The tension between the need for truth and the need for the privilege 
has generated a heated debate over the DOJ's waiver policy. Those who 
favor the policy note that investigations into corporate misconduct are 
complex and government agencies have limited resources.28 Thus, a 
corporation's willingness to self-govern with sufficient transparency to 
assure government agencies of its compliance with the law is a valuable 
mechanism. It preserves government resources and at the same time 
protects shareholders from the reputational costs associated with 
indictment. 29 
Critics of the waiver policy point to potential government 
circumvention of employees' Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination; interference with corporate counsels' ability to effectively 
guide corporate employees, officers, and directors toward compliance 
with the law; and arguably, erosion of a privilege that has a long, strong 
history in American jurisprudence. 30 
A. THE ATTORNEY -CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WAIVER DOCTRINE 
Although its scope may vary, the attorney-client privilege is the 
only communications privilege recognized by every state.3l Generally, 
the privilege protects confidential communications between client and 
attorney made for the purpose of securing legal advice or 
representation.32 However, the privilege protects only the actual 
communication between the client and the attorney, and not the 
underlying facts or subject matter of that communication.33 
The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage a 
client's full and candid disclosure to his or her attorney so that the 
28 See Colin P. Marks, Corporate Investigations, Attorney-Client Privilege, and Selective 
Waiver: Is a Half-Privilege Worth Having at All?, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 155, 167; see also Peter 
Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate Crime, Advancement of Executives' Defense Costs, and the 
Federal Courts (Part 1),7 U.c. DAVIS BuS. L.1. 2 (2006). 
29 See Colin P. Marks, Corporate Investigations, Attorney-Client Privilege, and Selective 
Waiver: Is a Half-Privilege Worth Having at All?, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 155,167. 
30 See, e.g., The Decline Of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Context: Survey 
Results, Presented to the United States Congress and the United States Sentencing Commission by 
the Following Organizations: American Chemistry Council, American Civil Liberties Union, 
Association of Corporate Counsel, Business Civil Liberties, Inc., Business Roundtable, The 
Financial Services Roundtable, Frontiers of Freedom, National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers, National Association of Manufacturers, National Defense Industrial Association, Retail 
Industry Leaders Association, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Washington Legal Foundation, 
http://www.acc.comlSurveys/attyclient2.pdf(last visited Aug. 28, 2008). 
31 Ford Motor Co. v. Leggat, 904 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Tex. 1995). 
32/d. 
33 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,395 (1981). 
7
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attorney may best represent the client and encourage compliance with the 
law.34 Likewise, corporate attorneys may have privileged 
communications with employees for the purpose of handling legal issues 
and guiding the corporation toward compliance, although they represent 
the corporation and not its employees.35 Despite its importance, courts 
must apply the attorney-client privilege narrowly because it frustrates the 
fundamental principle that the public has a right to all available 
evidence.36 Courts should ensure that the exclusion of relevant evidence 
serves the purpose of the privilege and is for the greater public good.37 
The attorney-client privilege is not absolute. The holder of the 
privilege must be able to establish that the communication sought to be 
protected meets certain requirements.38 If challenged, the holder of the 
34 Id. at 389. 
35 Id. at 392-93. However, as long as a lawyer conducting an investigation for the 
corporation infonns employees that the lawyer represents the company, not the employee, the 
employee has no legitimate expectation that the communication will remain confidential. Peter 
Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate Crime, Advancement of Executives' Defense Costs. and the 
Federal Courts (Part II), 7 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 2 n.180 (2006), available at 
http://blj.ucdavis.eduJarticle.asp?id=650. 
36 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-10 (1974) ("The very integrity of the 
judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within 
the framework of the rules of evidence .... [T]hese exceptions to the demand for every man's 
evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search 
for truth."). 
37 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) ("[Testimonial privileges] must be 
strictly construed and accepted only to the very limited extent that pennitting a refusal to testify or 
excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the nonnally predominant principle of 
utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth."). 
38 X Corp. v. Doe, 805 F. Supp. 1298, 1306 (E.D. Va. 1992) ('The party seeking to invoke 
the privilege bears the burden of establishing that the attorney-client relationship existed, that the 
particular communications at issue are privileged, and that the privilege has not been waived."). The 
"classic test" applied in federal courts to detennine whether the privilege existed is as follows: 
The privilege applies only if(1) the asserted holder ofthe privilege is or sought to be come a 
client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a 
court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; 
(3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was infonned (a) by his client 
(b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an 
opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) 
for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and 
(b) not waived by the client. 
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D.C. Mass. 1950). State courts 
have similar requirements. See. e.g.. Tien v. Super. Ct., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 121, 126-27 (Ct. App. 
2006) (,"[Clonfidential communication between client and lawyer' means infonnation transmitted 
between a client and his or her lawyer in the course of that relationship and in confidence by a means 
which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the infonnation to no third persons other than those 
who are present to further the interest of the client in the consultation or those to whom disclosure is 
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the infonnation or the accomplishment of the purpose 
for which the lawyer is consulted, and includes a legal opinion fonned and the advice given by the 
8
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privilege must show that the communication does not fall into any 
exceptions.39 Furthermore, a party can waive the privilege expressly or 
by implication through failure to assert the privilege in a proceeding, or 
through disclosure of privileged information to a third party.40 
The purpose of the waiver doctrine is to prevent selective disclosure 
of privileged information that would allow the holder of the privilege to 
disclose the information as a sword against an adversary, and 
subsequently assert the privilege as a shield in a later proceeding.41 
Furthermore, once the holder of the privilege discloses confidential 
information to a third party, the purpose and policy behind the attorney-
client privilege no longer apply because the information has ceased to be 
confidentia1.42 The waiver doctrine is in line with both the narrow scope 
of the attorney-client privilege and the fundamental policy that the public 
should have full knowledge of all relevant facts to best support a truthful 
and fair result. 
B. GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIVE POLICIES: WAIVER AS AN ELEMENT 
OF COOPERATION 
The nature of a corporation makes criminal investigations difficult. 
Prosecutors have trouble determining who the actors were, where the 
lines of authority lead, and how to locate relevant records that may be 
spread among a corporation's divisions.43 As a result, government 
lawyer in the course of that relationship.") (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE § 952 (2003». 
39 Although they will vary somewhat by jurisdiction, common exceptions to the attorney-
client privilege include (I) when the communication is to further a crime or fraud, (2) when an 
attorney reasonably believes that disclosure is necessary to prevent a criminal act that will result in 
the death or great bodily injury of another, (3) when the client puts the communication at issue in a 
proceeding, (4) when the lawyer is an attesting witness concerning a client's intention or competence 
in executing the attested document, (5) when the intention or validity of a document executed by a 
deceased client concerning property interests is at issue, and (6) when a communication between 
joint clients is offered in evidence in subsequent civil litigation between them. See CAL. EVID. CODE 
§§ 956-62 (1967). 
40 See X Corp. v. Doe, 805 F. Supp. at 1306 n.15. 
41 Louis M. Brown, Anne O. Kandel, & Richard S. Gruner, The Legal Audit: Corporate 
Internal Investigation Current Through the August 2007 Update, Chapter 9. Protecting the 
Confidentiality of Investigative Documents, LEGAL AUDIT § 9:39 (2007); see Tennenbaum v. 
Deloitte & Touche, 77 F.3d 337,340-41 (9th Cir. 1996). 
42 Colin P. Marks, Corporate Investigations, Attorney-Client Privilege, and Selective 
Waiver: Is a Half-Privilege Worth Having at All?, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 155, 167 ("The 
justification for granting the privilege 'ceases when the client does not appear to have been desirous 
of secrecy.''') (citing Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981». 
43 Id.; see also Peter Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate Crime, Advancement of 
Executives'Defense Costs, and the Federal Courts (Part I), 7 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 2 (2006) 
("White collar crime often involves complex financial transactions where the 'money trail' is 
exceedingly difficult to trace. Moreover, the sophistication of the personnel involved makes 
9
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agencies such as the DO] have placed high value on a corporation's 
willingness and ability to effectively cooperate with investigations and to 
proactively remediate any wrongdoing within the organization.44 In 
exchange for cooperation, the DO] may offer leniency in the form of 
lesser charges, or no indictment at all.45 Corporations find this offered 
benefit difficult to turn down because they are under tremendous 
pressure to avoid the reputational effects of indictment and the resulting 
financial loss that innocent shareholders would likely suffer.46 
Therefore, it is argued, the DO] charging policy coerces the waivers and 
ultimately erodes the attorney-client privilege by undermining its 
purpose.47 
'smoking guns' rare. In addition, ... the participants in such conduct [are] dependant on one 
another in a way that is difficult to disrupt."). 
44 Claudius O. Sokenu, The Current Enforcement Environment and the Corporate Response, 
Practising Law Institute, 1617 PU/CORP 331, 333 (2007). The SEC has a similar program of 
leniency in exchange for cooperation. On October 23,2001, the SEC released the Seaboard Report, 
which outlined criteria it will consider when determining whether to bring an enforcement action 
against a corporation. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement 
Decisions, Securities Exchange Act, ReI. No. 44969 (Oct. 23, 2001) available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigationlinvestreportl34-44969.htm. First and foremost, the SEC considers 
what will best protect investors, and because cooperation with law enforcement can help accomplish 
that end, the Seaboard Report "set forth some of the criteria [the SEC] will consider in determining 
whether, and how much, to credit self-policing, self-reporting, remediation and cooperation." Id. 
Within these four broad categories, the Seaboard Report listed thirteen factors to consider. Id. 
Among the factors is whether the company voluntarily discloses information that the SEC otherwise 
might not have uncovered. Id. The Seaboard Report noted that companies may choose to waive the 
attorney-client privilege out of "desire to provide information"; however, it "does not view a 
company's waiver of a privilege as an end in itself, but only as a means (where necessary) to provide 
relevant and sometimes critical information." Id. 
45 Claudius O. Sokenu, The Current Enforcement Environment and the Corporate Response, 
Practising Law Institute, 1617 PU/CoRP 331, 355-66, 362-63 (2007). 
46 For example, financial-services firms like Arthur Andersen LLP rarely survive criminal 
charges. See Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and "Good Corporate 
Citizenship," 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 979, 981 n.9 (2002) (citing Lynn Cowan & Cheryl Winokur 
Munk, Anderson: Called to Account: Criminal Charges Threaten Auditor's Survival, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 18, 2002, at col. 15 ("In the past two decades, no financial-services firm has remained in 
business after facing criminal charges.")). This is likely because such firms rely on their reputation 
and customer trust, both of which may be lost when allegations of fraud are made public. On the eve 
of its indictment (which followed massive shredding of documents in alleged obstruction of justice), 
Arthur Andersen's lawyer argued that criminal charges meant '''[d]eath, death, death'" for the firm." 
Id. (quoting Flynn McRoberts, Repeat Offender Gets StifJ Justice, CHI. TRlB., Sept. 4, 2002 at I, 
available at 2002 WLNR 12598004). 
47 See The Decline of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Context: Survey Results, 
Presented to the United States Congress and the United States Sentencing Commission by the 
Following Organizations: American Chemistry Council, American Civil Liberties Union, 
Association of Corporate Counsel, Business Civil Liberties, Inc., Business Roundtable, The 
Financial Services Roundtable, Frontiers of Freedom, National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers, National Association of Manufacturers, National Defense Industrial Association, Retail 
10
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1. The Department of Justice's Charging Guidelines in Corporate Fraud 
Prosecutions 
The DOJ publicly announced and later revised a set of principles 
designed to guide federal prosecutors in the decision whether to 
prosecute a business organization.48 Generally, these principles require 
U.S. Attorneys to consider the culpability of the corporation, any 
remedial measures taken, and the corporation's willingness to cooperate 
with government investigations.49 To avoid indictment, a corporation 
must convince prosecutors that prosecution will not serve the purposes of 
criminal justice and will only harm innocent shareholders. so 
The charging policy lists nine factors for prosecutors to consider 
when deciding whether to charge a corporation.S1 These factors take into 
Industry Leaders Association, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Washington Legal Foundation, 
http://www.acc.comlSurveys/attyclient2.pdf(last visited Aug. 28, 2008). 
48 The DOl's 1999 Holder Memorandum established the basic principles for charging 
business entities and the DOJ's 2003 Thompson Memorandum incorporated these principles and 
made them binding on prosecutors. Claudius O. Sokenu, The Current Enforcement Environment 
and the Corporate Response, Practising Law Institute, 1617 P~/CORP 331, 349 (2007). The 
Thompson Memorandum also emphasized the need to distinguish frue cooperation and refonnation 
of the business entity from a corporation merely paying "lip service" to the government while 
protecting or failing to revamp the practices that allowed the illegal behavior. Memorandum of 
Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., United States Dep't of Justice, Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/daglcftf/corporate~uidelines.htm. The 2006 McNulty Memorandum 
amended the charging policy to respond to criticisms about the inclusion of waiver of the attorney-
client privilege as an element of cooperation. Memorandum of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., 
United States Dep't of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (2003) 
at 8-9, http://www.usdoj.gov/daglspeeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf. 
49 See Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att'y Gen., United States Dep't of Justice, Bringing 
Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), I White Collar Crime § 3:49 (2d ed.), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/reports/1999/chargingcorps.html; Memorandum of Larry 
D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., United States Dep't of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution 
of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/daglcftf/corporate~iJidelines.htm; Memorandum of Paul 1. McNulty, Deputy 
Att'y Gen., United States Dep't of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations (2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/daglspeeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf. 
50 Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and "Good Corporate 
Citizenship," 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 979, 995 (2002); see Memorandum of Larry D. Thompson, 
Deputy Att'y Gen., United States Dep't of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations at Section X (Jan. 20, 2003), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/daglcftf/corporate~uidelines.htm. 
51 These factors include the nature and seriousness of the offense, the pervasiveness of 
wrongdoing within the corporation, a history of similar conduct, the existence of an adequate 
compliance program, whether the corporation has taken any remedial actions, whether prosecution 
of the responsible individuals and/or civil and regulatory actions against the corporation will suffice, 
the collateral adverse consequences of prosecution for innocent parties, and cooperation with 
prosecutors. Memorandum of Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., United States Dep't of 
Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations at Section II (Jan. 20, 2003), 
11
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account the nature of the corporate "person," including the extent of the 
corporation's cooperation with prosecutors. 52 Cooperation comes in 
many forms. Prosecutors expect corporations to admit to wrongdoing or 
at least take responsibility for employees' wrongdoing, 53 and refrain 
from impeding investigations. 54 Importantly, a corporation should act as 
soon as it has knowledge of the misconduct. 55 Firing employees 
involved in the illegal acts and the managers who were in charge of those 
employees,56 as well as instituting structural, managerial, and policy 
changes designed to prevent a recurrence of the misconduct, have also 
helped corporations avoid indictment. 57 In other words, a corporation 
must convince prosecutors that prosecution is unnecessary.58 
Cooperation includes, if necessary, waiver of corporate attorney-
client privilege. 59 As of the 2006 amendments to the charging policy, 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate~uidelines.htm. 
52 The Thompson Memorandum emphasized cooperation because U a corporation's 
cooperation may be critical in identifying the culprits and locating relevant evidence." 
Memorandum of Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., United States Dep't of Justice, Principles 
of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations at Section IV (Jan. 20, 2003), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/daglcftf/corporate~uidelines.htm. 
53 Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and "Good Corporate 
Citizenship," 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 979, 1007 (2002) ("Most obviously, a corporation that denies 
wrongdoing and resists a criminal investigation is far more likely to be indicted than a corporation 
that cooperates with prosecutors. More particularly, a corporation's chances of avoiding indictment 
are much greater if the cooperation admits its responsibility for the wrongdoing, terminates the 
wrongdoers, rids itself of the top management in charge at the time of the wrongdoing, and waives 
its privileges so that its cooperation can be free and unfettered."). 
54 Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective Cooperation by Business Organizations and the Impact of 
Privilege Waivers, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 587, 593 (2004) (citing Thompson Memorandum). 
55 Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and "Good Corporate 
Citizenship," 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 979, 999-1006 (2002) (e.g., to protect his investment in 
Salomon Brothers, Warren Buffet acted within days; Daiwa was indicted after it waited almost two 
months after it learned of misconduct to inform regulators). 
56 1d. at 1007-08 ("[P]erhaps the most important [factor] in facilitating a corporation's full 
cooperation is a change in top management. ... Indeed, without a change in top management, it can 
be nearly impossible for a corporation to fully cooperate, because the top managers will essentially 
be cooperating against themselves."). 
57 Id. at 999 (describing the actions of Kidder Peabody & Company in response to exposure 
of illegal trading schemes that took place within the company-within four months after the federal 
investigation began, prosecutors announced that no criminal charges would be filed against Kidder). 
58 As the Thompson Memorandum stated, "[t]he primary goals of criminal law are 
deterrence, punishment, and rehabilitation. Non-criminal sanctions may not be an appropriate 
response to an egregious violation, a pattern of wrongdoing, or a history of non-criminal sanctions 
without proper remediation." Memorandum of Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., United 
States Dep't of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations at Section X 
(Jan. 20,2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/daglcftf/corporatepidelines.htm. 
59 See id. at Section II: Charging a Corporation: Factors to Be Considered. Waivers of the 
attorney-client privilege "permit the government to obtain statements of possible witnesses, subjects, 
and targets, without having to negotiate individual cooperation or immunity agreements. 
12
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prosecutors may request waivers only if they can demonstrate a 
legitimate need to the U.S. Attorney Genera1.60 If a corporation asserts 
its privilege in the face of a waiver request, the DO] may not deem the 
corporation uncooperative. However, the DO] rewards voluntary 
waivers with favorable consideration.61 Though it may help a 
corporation achieve cooperative status, waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege is not a guarantee against indictment.62 There may be 
circumstances where corporate misconduct is so pervasive and serious 
that no amount of cooperation will prevent indictment.63 
Additionally, they are often critical in enabling the government to evaluate the completeness of a 
corporation's voluntary disclosure and cooperation." [d. at Section IV: Charging a Corporation: 
Cooperation and Voluntary Disclosure. 
60 In response to extensive criticism of the inclusion of waiver of the attorney-client privilege 
as an element of cooperation, the DOJ amended its charging guidelines in the 2006 McNulty 
Memorandum. See Memorandum of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., United States Dep't of 
Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (2003), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf. The revised guidelines "amplifIy] the 
limited circumstances under which prosecutors may ask for waivers of privilege," emphasizing that 
"legal advice, mental impressions and conclusions and legal determinations by counsel are 
protected." Prepared Remarks of Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty at the Lawyers for Civil 
Justice Membership Conference Regarding the Department's Charging Guidelines in Corporate 
Fraud Prosecutions (Dec. 12, 2006), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/dag/speeches/2006/dag...speech_06l2l2.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 
2008). Now, a prosecutor must get approval directly from the Attorney General in writing before he 
or she may request a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Id. To obtain approval, the prosecutor 
must show a "legitimate need" for the information, i.e., 
[d. 
(I) the likelihood and degree to which the privileged information will benefit the 
government's investigation; (2) whether the information sought can be obtained in a timely 
and complete fashion by using alternative means that do not require waiver; (3) the 
completeness of the voluntary disclosure already provided; and (4) the collateral 
consequences to the corporation in requesting a waiver. 
61 Id. 
62 For example, Reliant Energy, one of the largest independent power producers in the 
United States, was indicted in April 2004 in spite of the fact that it voluntarily disclosed information 
to the DOJ. Reliant Energy Website, News Releases, Reliant Resources Asserts Subsidiary Violated 
No Laws, Plans Vigorous Defense (Apr. 8, 2004), 
http://www.reliant.comlPublicLinkAction.do?i_chronicle_id=090 17 522800026fe&languagccode=e 
n_US&ijull_format=jsp (click on link to "2004" then scroll down to link with article title) 
("Moreover, any suggestion that Reliant did not fully cooperate with the Department of Justice 
investigation is inaccurate and unfair. The company voluntarily disclosed the conduct, agreed to a 
settlement with the FERC, assisted in making evidence available to the CFTC and Department of 
Justice, and made a series of presentations to the Department of Justice concerning the facts and the 
law. What Reliant did not do was agree that the conduct constitutes a criminal offense."). 
63 As the Thompson Memorandum stated, "[t]he primary goals of criminal law are 
deterrence, punishment, and rehabilitation. Non-criminal sanctions may not be an appropriate 
response to an egregious violation, a pattern of wrongdoing, or a history of non-criminal sanctions 
without proper remediation." Memorandum of Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., United 
States Dep't of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations at Section X 
13
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2. Criticism of the Waiver Policy 
The American Bar Association, American Civil Liberties Union, 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, legal scholars and 
others have sharply criticized the inclusion of waiver of attorney-client 
privilege as an element of cooperation.64 Corporate executives and 
attorneys contend that federal prosecutors, far from respecting the 
privilege, routinely request waivers.65 To support this contention, the 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Association 
of Corporate Counsel conducted a survey that indicated that corporate 
attorneys consider waiver requests the norm rather than the exception.66 
However, a government survey has shown the opposite.67 
One criticism is that the waiver policy erodes the attorney-client 
(Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate~idelines.htm. 
64 The Decline of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Context: Survey Results, 
Presented to the United States Congress and the United States Sentencing Commission by the 
Following Organizations: American Chemistry Council, American Civil Liberties Union, 
Association of Corporate Counsel, Business Civil Liberties, Inc., Business Roundtable, The 
Financial Services Roundtable, Frontiers of Freedom, National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers, National Association of Manufacturers, National Defense Industrial Association, Retail 
Industry Leaders Association, U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
Washington Legal Foundation, http://www.acc.comlSurveys/attyc1ient2.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 
2008); see also Stephanie A. Martz, The Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, 
CHAMPION, May 2007 at 40. 
65 Louis M. Brown, Anne O. Kandel, & Richard S. Gruner, The Legal Audit: Corporate 
Internal investigation Current Through the August 2007 Update, LEGAL AUDIT § 9:39 (2007) 
("waiver has become a standard expectation of federal prosecutors and is not merely requested 
'when necessary'''). 
66 NACDL Statement of Attorney-Client Privilege (2006) available at 
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsflWhiteCollarIWCnews024/$FILE/Privilege_Statement06.pdf; see 
also Marcia Coyle, New Legislation Would Bolster Attorney-Client Rights in Investigations, 
NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (July 26, 2007), available at 
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/whitecollar/wcnews082?OpenDocument ("[A] new survey by the 
Association of Corporate Counsel that found that more than 90 percent of 458 in-house counsel 
responding believe that the attorney-client privilege in the context of government investigations is 
either nonexistent or severely damaged. That is an increase from the organization's 2005 survey, 
when 74 percent of respondents shared those sentiments."). 
67 Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective Cooperation by Business Organizations and the Impact of 
Privilege Waivers, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 587, 588-98 (2004) ("In late 2002, at least partly in 
response to these criticisms, the Ad Hoc Advisory Group conducted a survey to determine the 
frequency of requests made by all ninety-four U.S. Attorneys' Offices for privilege waivers from 
organizational defendants .... [T]he survey revealed that requests for waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege ... were the exception rather than the rule: Waivers were requested in a very small number 
of cases - four cases in the Southern District of New York, six cases in the District of Massachusetts, 
six cases in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and two cases in the Eastern District of North 
Carolina. The Northern District of Mississippi indicated that it has a practice of negotiating informal, 
partial, unwritten waivers."); see also The U.S. Sentencing Comm'n Ad Hoc Advisory Group, 
Report on The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines at 8 (Oct. 7, 2003), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/corp/advgrprpt/advgrprpt.htm. 
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privilege, which in tum chills corporate counsel's ability to advise and 
represent the corporation because employees will withhold infonnation 
out of fear of exposure.68 According to critics, employee fears are well 
founded because these waivers allow the government to circumvent 
employees' privileges against self-incrimination. The government 
encourages employers to pressure their employees to make potentially 
self-incriminating statements as part of an internal investigation, and 
these unprotected statements69 are subsequently disclosed to the 
government when the corporation waives its attorney-client privilege.7o 
Furthennore, government investigation frequently results in third-
party civil suitS.71 Civil plaintiffs may demand access to privileged 
infonnation that a corporation disclosed to government prosecutors, on 
the grounds that the disclosure waived the privilege. In these situations, 
courts often grant plaintiffs' requests.72 The likelihood of exposure in 
subsequent civil suits forces a corporation facing indictment to weigh the 
associated reputational costs of criminal charges against the potential 
cost of allowing civil plaintiffs access to privileged infonnation. 
Although the 2006 amendments to the DOJ's charging policy 
sought to address these concerns, critics believe that the revised 
guidelines still fail to adequately protect the privilege.73 Because the 
68 See, e.g., Colin P. Marks, Corporate Investigations, Attorney-Client Privilege, and 
Selective Waiver: Is a Half-Privilege Worth Having at All?, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REv. ISS, 180-186 
(2006); Louis M. Brown, Anne O. Kandel, & Richard S. Gruner, The Legal Audit: Corporate 
Internal Investigation Current Through the August 2007 Update, LEGAL AUDIT § 9:39 (2007). 
69 As long as a lawyer conducting an investigation for the corporation informs the employee 
that the lawyer represents the company, not the employee, the employee has no legitimate 
expectation that the communication will remain confidential. Peter Margulies, Legal Hazard: 
Corporate Crime, Advancement of Executives' Defense Costs, and the Federal Courts (part II), 7 
U.C. Davis Bus. L.J. 2 n.180 (2006), available at http://blj.ucdavis.eduJarticle.asp?id=650. 
70 See, e.g., Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective Cooperation by Business Organizations and the 
Impact of Privilege Waivers, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 587, 595-96 (2004); Colin P. Marks, 
Corporate Investigations, Attorney-Client Privilege, and Selective Waiver: Is a Half-Privilege Worth 
Having at All?, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 155, 173-74 (2006) ("[S]uch waivers permit the government 
to obtain statements of possible witnesses, subjects, and targets, without having to negotiate 
individual cooperation or immunity agreements .... ") (citing the Thompson Memorandum). 
71 Louis M. Brown, Anne o. Kandel, & Richard S. Gruner, The Legal Audit: Corporate 
Internal Investigation Current Through the August 2007 Update, LEGAL AUDIT § 9:39 (2007) 
("Fifteen percent of companies that experienced a governmental investigation within the past five 
years indicated that the investigation generated related third-party civil suits (such as private antitrust 
suits or derivative securities law suits)."). 
72 For a comprehensive discussion of selective waiver and its treatment by federal courts, see 
In re ColumbiaIHCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 295-314 (6th Cir. 
2002). 
73 Louis M. Brown, Anne O. Kandel, & Richard S. Gruner, The Legal Audit: Corporate 
Internal Investigation Current Through the August 2007 Update, LEGAL AUDIT § 9:39 (2007) ("By 
allowing privilege waiver requests under some circumstances and by providing large rewards for 
15
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reward for voluntary waiver - favorable consideration and a reduced risk 
of indictment - is so tempting, few corporations will resist. 74 As 
corporations continue to waive their privileges, guarantees of 
confidentiality become meaningless, thereby undermining the purpose of 
the privilege.75 The growing movement against the waiver policy has 
been reflected in proposed legislative measures. For example, an early 
version of proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 502 would have expressly 
allowed selective waiver; i.e., disclosure of privileged documents to the 
government for purposes of government investigation would not 
constitute a waiver; 76 that provision, however, was omitted from Rule 
502 as enacted.77 The proposed Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act 
of 2007 would prevent government agents from demanding waiver of the 
privilege under any circumstances and preclude favorable consideration 
of voluntary waivers. 78 
Until, if ever, the proposed legislation becomes law, the question 
remains: does the government policy of considering waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege as an element of cooperation rise to the level of 
coercion? If it does, corporations can save themselves from exposure in 
subsequent civil suits if they choose to disclose privileged information. 
Or, they can fight their indictments on the grounds that the government's 
evidence was gained through illegal coercion. However, as 
demonstrated below, as long as a corporation knowingly and intelligently 
waives its attorney-client privileges for purposes of obtaining a benefit 
from the government, the mere threat of indictment without any 
wrongful act on the part of the prosecutor or impermissible curtailment 
of a constitutional right does not coerce the waiver. 
voluntary privilege waivers, the standards in the McNulty Memorandum will still undercut the 
confidentiality guarantees that are necessary for the attorney-client privilege ... to serve [its] 
important purpose in promoting corporate self-evaluations and legal advice."). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Kenneth S. Broun & Daniel J. Capra, Getting Control of Waiver of Privilege in the 
Federal Courts: A Proposal For a Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 58 S.C. L. REv. 211, 250-51 
(2006); see Committee on Rules and Practices of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 
Report of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, May 15,2006 (revised June 30, 2006), FED. 
R. EVID. 502(c) (Proposed 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ruleslReports/EV05-
2006.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2008). 
77 See FED. R. EVID. 502 (Pub. L. No. 110-322, § I(a), 122 Stat. 3537 (2008». 
78 The Attorney-Client Privilege Act of 2007 passed through the House of Representatives on 
November 13, 2007. House of Representatives Proceedings and Debates of the I 10th Congress, The 
Attorney-Client Privilege Act of2007, 153 Congo Rec. HI3562-01, 2007 WL 3355182 (Cong. Rec.) 
(Nov. 13,2007); see Stephanie A. Martz, The Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007,31-
May CHAMPION 40 (2007). The status of the bill can be tracked online at GovTrackUS, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congresslbill.xpd?bil1=hII0-3013. 
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II. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR COERCION 
Like corporations, individual criminal defendants often face hard 
choices. For example, every plea bargain entered into by a criminal 
defendant requires waiver of constitutional privileges and rights to avoid 
risk of a more severe punishment. 79 Though these decisions may be 
difficult, they are not legally the result of coercion. What corporations 
face today are merely the accepted norms of our criminal justice system, 
which have always applied to natural persons accused of crimes. 80 
A. COERCION REQUIRES A WRONGFUL ACT 
The only clear definition of coerced waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege arises in one context: disclosure erroneously compelled by 
court order.8l For example, California Evidence Code section 919(b) 
provides that if a person asserts the attorney-client privilege in a 
proceeding,82 but is erroneously compelled by an order of the presiding 
officer to disclose the privileged information, the disclosure has been 
coerced.83 
Under this definition of coercion, the DOJ's waiver policy could 
only coerce a waiver when (1) the prosecutor issued a subpoena 
demanding disclosure of privileged information; (2) the corporation 
asserted the attorney-client privilege and refused to produce the 
documents; and (3) the court erroneously found that the information was 
not privileged and compelled disclosure. However, usually both the 
corporation and the prosecutor agree that the information is privileged, 
79 U.S. v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196,209-10 (1995). 
80 See id. 
81 See UNIF. R. EVID. 510(b) ("Involuntary disclosure. A claim of privilege is not waived by 
a disclosure that was compelled erroneously or made without the opportunity to claim the 
privilege."); CAL. EVID. CODE § 919(b) ("If a person authorized to claim the [attorney-client] 
privilege claimed it, whether in the same or a prior proceeding, but nevertheless disclosure 
erroneously was required by the presiding officer to be made, neither the failure to refuse to disclose 
nor the failure to seek review of the order of the presiding officer requiring disclosure indicates 
consent to the disclosure or constitutes a waiver and, under these circumstances, the disclosure is one 
made under coercion."). 
82 Government investigations constitute proceedings because a court can issue a subpoena to 
compel disclosure of information for purposes of the investigation. See 2 B.E.WITKlN, CALIFORNIA 
EVIDENCE, Witnesses § 65, at 316 (4th ed. 2000) ("If confidentiality is to be protected effectively by 
a privilege, the privilege must be recognized in proceedings other than judicial proceedings. The 
protection afforded by a privilege would be insufficient if a court were the only place where the 
privilege could be invoked. Every officer with power to issue subpoenas for investigative purposes, 
every administrative agency, every local governing board, and many more persons could pry into the 
protected information if the privilege rules were applicable only in judicial proceedings."). 
83 CAL. EVID. CODE § 919(b). 
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and the corporation does not assert its privilege in court. Thus, the issue 
of being erroneously compelled to disclose privileged information does 
not arise. 
Common-law definitions of coercion strongly suggest that without 
some improper act on the part of the prosecutor, a corporation's waiver 
of its attorney-client privilege is not coerced. For example, the Model 
Penal Code defines criminal coercion as making certain untruthful or 
unjustified threats "with the purpose of unlawfully restricting another's 
freedom of action to his detriment.,,84 Thus, criminal coercion requires a 
wrongful act (the unjustified threat) and a wrongful purpose (unlawfully 
restricting another's freedom). 
Under tort law, a plaintiff must meet three requirements to recover 
damages for coercion. First, there must be some wrongful or unlawful 
act or conduct on the part of the defendant; second, that wrongful or 
unlawful act must be sufficient to prevent the plaintiff from exercising 
his or her free will; and third, the plaintiff must suffer harm as a result. 85 
Furthermore, and relevant to the assertion that the threat of indictment 
coerces waivers of the attorney-client privilege, "mere threats of criminal 
prosecution will not sustain a tortious coercion claim.,,86 
Similarly, in contract law, a victim may void a contract if his or her 
consent to the contract was induced by improper threats that leave the 
victim with no reasonable alternative.87 A threat of criminal prosecution 
is improper when the threat involves a misuse of power for personal 
84 Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, 537 U.S. 393, 40S n.13 (2003) (citing MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 212.5, cmt. 2, at 264). The Model Penal Code states: 
(I) Offense Defined. A person is guilty of criminal coercion if, with purpose unlawfully to 
restrict another's freedom of action to his detriment, he threatens to: 
(a) commit any criminal offense; or 
(b) accuse anyone of a criminal offense; or 
(c) expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to 
impair his credit or business repute; or 
(d) take or withhold action as an official, or cause an official to take or withhold action. 
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution based on paragraphs (b), (c) or (d) that the actor 
believed the accusation or secret to be true or the proposed official action justified and that 
his purpose was limited to compelling the other to behave in a way reasonably related to the 
circumstances which were the subject of the accusation, exposure or proposed official action, 
as by desisting from further misbehavior, making good a wrong done, refraining from taking 
any action or responsibility for which the actor believes the other disqualified. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5. 
85 86 C.l.S. Threats § 32 (2007); see, e.g., Agnew v. Parks, 343 P.2d lIS, 123 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1959) ("it is not actionable coercion or duress to threaten to do what one has a legal right to do") 
(citations omitted). 
86 86 C.l.S. Threats § 32 (2007). 
87 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (\981) (explaining when duress by threat 
makes a contract voidable). 
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gain.88 However, a good-faith explanation of the criminal consequences 
of another's conduct may not be a threat at all. Generally, a threat to do 
that which one has the legal right to do will not be found coercive unless 
the right is abused or the threat is made in bad faith.89 Under the 
defmitions of coercion, it appears that the DOJ's waiver policy alone, 
without specific wrongful acts by prosecutors, could not legally coerce a 
corporation's waivers. The analysis of coercion claims in case law, as 
discussed below, reinforces this finding. 
B. ANALYSIS UNDER EXISTING LEGAL STANDARDS FOR A FINDING OF 
COERCED WAIVER IN CASE LAW 
Consistent with general common-law concepts of coercion, case law 
addressing the voluntariness of waivers focuses on government actions to 
determine whether coercion has occurred. The Supreme Court has 
analyzed claims of coerced waivers in at least three contexts: (1) waiver 
of Miranda rights90 during government interrogation, (2) waiver of the 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in the face of a 
government threat of job loss, and (3) waivers of constitutional rights and 
privileges in the context of plea bargaining. Constitutional rights 
generally enjoy greater protection from the courts than do common-law 
privileges.91 Thus, it is fair to say that constitutional protections create a 
baseline threshold for coercion; i.e., without specific statutory language 
to the contrary, non-constitutional privileges such as the attorney-client 
88 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176, cm!. c (1981). Other improper threats 
include a threatened crime or tort, bad faith threat of civil proceedings, threatened breach of an 
existing contract, threatened use of power for illegitimate ends, threat strengthened by prior unfair 
dealings, and when the threatened act would hann the victim and not benefit the party making the 
threat (i.e., indicates vindictiveness). /d., cmt. f. 
89 28 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 71 :26 (4th ed. West 2007). 
90 In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court established that 
prosecutors cannot use statements made by a defendant during custodial interrogation unless certain 
procedural safeguards are in place to protect the defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. Namely, before being questioned, a person must be warned "that he has right to 
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has 
the right to presence of attorney, retained or appointed." /d. at 444. A defendant may waive the 
right to counsel and to remain silent, "provided that waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and 
intelligently." /d. 
91 Constitutional rights are a part of the supreme law of the land which can only be changed 
through an amendment to the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see Cooper v. Aaron, 358 
U.S. I, 18 (1958) ("[T]he United States Constitution is the supreme law of the land, it is binding to 
all states such that states cannot make laws that conflict with the Constitution, and every state 
legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath to support the 
Constitution."). Statutory and common-law privileges, however, can be given or taken away by the 
legislature. 
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privilege will not require a test more stringent than one used to protect 
privileges of constitutional dimensions.92 Under the legal standards for 
coercion established by the Supreme Court, in the absence of wrongful 
government conduct, corporations that knowingly and intelligently waive 
their attorney-client privilege in exchange for the benefit of reduced risk 
of indictment do so voluntarily. 
1. The Legal Standard for Coerced Miranda Waivers 
The Supreme Court has held that to determine whether a defendant 
voluntarily waived his or her Miranda rights, a court must consider two 
factors. First, it must consider whether the waiver was the product of a 
free and deliberate choice, and second, it must consider whether the 
defendant was fully aware of the nature of the right and the consequences 
of waiving it.93 A court reviews these factors in light of the totality of 
the circumstances.94 
The totality-of-the-circumstances approach requires consideration 
of "the defendant's age, experience, education, background, and 
intelligence, and whether the defendant has the capacity to understand 
the Miranda warnings, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the 
consequences of waiving those rights.,,95 And, consistent with cornrnon-
law definitions of coercion, some wrongful government activity must 
have occurred.96 The requirement of wrongful government conduct 
comports with the rationale for excluding evidence obtained through 
coerced waivers of rights and privileges, specifically, that information 
acquired through coercion is not trustworthy and the methods used to 
92 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. Z18, 237 (1973) ("Almost without exception, the 
requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver has been applied only to those rights which the 
Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair triaL"); see also OKC 
Corp. v. Williams, 461 F. Supp. 540, 546 (N.D. Tex. 1978) ("[T]he attorney-client privilege ... is 
not a principle of constitutional proportions but a rule of evidence. While unquestionably valued and 
significant, the attorney-client privilege has not been elevated to the stature of a constitutional 
right."). 




96 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) ("coercive police activity is a 
necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 'voluntary' .... "); id. at 170 ("The 
voluntariness of a waiver of [the privilege against self-incrimination] has always depended on the 
absence of police overreaching, not on 'free choice' in any broader sense of the word."); see also 
People v. Jablonski, IZ6 P.3d 938, 965 (Cal. 2006) ("Voluntariness does not tum on anyone fact, no 
matter how apparently significant, but rather on the 'totality of [the] circumstances.' ... 'Coercive 
police activity is a necessary predicate ... .' Additionally, 'such activity must be, as it were, the 
'proximate cause' of the statement in question, and not merely a cause in fact."') (citations omitted). 
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obtain it are unjust. 97 
Without improper acts by prosecutors, a corporation's subjective 
fear of the consequences of indictment cannot legally coerce a waiver. 
Even if prosecutors behave improperly, the totality of the circumstances 
weighs against coercion. Corporations facing indictment comprise 
successful, educated, experienced parties who employ sophisticated 
counsel to advise them as to their rights and privileges and the 
consequences of any waivers.98 The sophistication of the parties and the 
presence of competent counsel will likely counteract any undue influence 
exerted by prosecutors.99 Fear of the collateral consequences of 
indictment may create a strong incentive for corporations to do whatever 
is necessary to avoid indictment, but corporations will have to point to 
something more compelling to meet the totality-of-the-circumstances 
legal standard for coercion. 
2. The Legal Standard for Coercion Under Garrity 
The Supreme Court has held that threat of job loss was sufficient to 
coerce statements that otherwise would have been protected by the 
privilege against self-incrimination. loo In Garrity v. New Jersey, 101 
during an investigation of alleged fixing of traffic tickets, the New Jersey 
Attorney General questioned several police officers. 102 Before being 
questioned, each officer was warned that he could invoke his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to answer, 
but that if he did so, he could be fired pursuant to a state statute that 
required complete candor of its officers. 103 The officers answered all 
97 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961) ("[T]he methods used to extract 
[involuntary confessions] offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that 
ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system - a system in which the State must establish 
guilt by evidence independently and freely secured .... "). 
98 Any reasonable corporate counsel should be aware that waiver to a government third party 
will likely constitute waiver for subsequent proceedings. As discussed, California and all but one 
federal circuit have ruled against selective waivers. Furthermore, the participation of the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Association of Corporate Counsel in the campaign 
against the DOJ's charging policy, as well as the extensive literature discussing the issue, create a 
fair assumption that corporate counsel are aware of the issue. 
99 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) ("Defendants advised by competent 
counsel and protected by other procedural safeguards are presumptively capable of intelligent choice 
in response to prosecutorial persuasion, and unlikely to be driven to false self-condemnation.") 
(citation omitted). 
100 Lisa K. Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 311,353 (2007). 
101 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). 
102 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. at 494. 
103 [d. 
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questions. 104 Prosecutors subsequently used the officers' responses to 
prosecute them for conspiracy to obstruct the administration of traffic 
laws. 105 The officers appealed their convictions on the ground that their 
statements had been coerced. 106 
The test for coercion was "whether the accused was deprived of his 
free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.,,107 The Court 
analogized the loss of a government job to forfeiture of property 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and held that the threat of 
losing one's livelihood could prevent a person from making a free and 
rational choice to invoke the constitutional right not to self-
incriminate. lOS Key to the Court's decision was the constitutional stature 
of the protections that had been compromised by the state statute. 109 
A corporation could argue that an indictment will effectively 
destroy the corporation, which is equivalent to a threat of job loss, which 
in tum is a sufficiently severe sanction to coerce a waiver of the attorney-
client privilege. llo However, this analogy is flawed. A corporation's 
waiver of the attorney-client privilege to avoid indictment does not meet 
the Garrity standard of coercion for two reasons. 
First, the Garrity analogy fails because a corporation's decision to 
disclose privileged information to government agents does not require 
the corporation to choose between two constitutional rights. Unlike the 
constitutional right against self-incrimination, the attorney-client 
privilege is statutory. Furthermore, a corporation does not have a 
constitutional right to a continued "means of livelihood" under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Although a corporation qualifies as a "person" 
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and enjoys the protection of 
its property rights through due process requirements, III the Supreme 
104 Id. 
105 1d. 
106 1d. at 495. 
107 1d. at 496 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
108 Id. at 497 (being faced with the "option to lose their means of livelihood or to pay the 
penalty of self-incrimination ... is 'likely to exert such pressure upon an individual as to disable him 
from making a free and rational choice."') (citation omitted). 
109 Id. at 500 ("There are rights of constitutional stature whose exercise a State may not 
condition by the exaction of a price."). 
110 Corporations have argued that indictment equals corporate death. See. e.g., Michael A. 
Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and "Good Corporate Citizenship," 76 ST. 
JOHN'S L. REV. 979, 981 n.9 (2002) (On the eve of its indictment (which followed massive 
shredding of documents in alleged obstruction of justice), "Arthur Andersen's lawyer argued that 
criminal charges meant '[dJeath, death, death' for the firm") (citing Flynn McRoberts, Repeat 
Offender Gets Stiff Justice, CHI. TRIB. at I, Sept. 4, 2002). 
1119 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Corporations § I, at 775 (10th ed. 2005) 
("the corporation is a 'person' within the meaning of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses 
22
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Court has circumscribed corporate constitutional protections. For 
example, the Privileges and Immunities protection of the Fourteenth 
Amendment applies only to natural persons, not corporations. 1 12 Neither 
can corporations claim the right to Liberty under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 113 Finally, some "purely personal" protections, such as the 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, have historically been 
reserved for natural persons due to the nature or purpose of the privilege 
and therefore do not apply to corporations. 1 14 
Though a corporation does have a constitutional right to its 
property, its continued "means of livelihood" does not have 
constitutional protection but is contingent upon the corporation's 
compliance with the state laws that created it. lIs For example, a 
corporation can be suspended and involuntarily dissolved for mere 
failure to file the proper documents with the secretary of state. 116 A 
suspended corporation loses its rights, powers, and privileges, is disabled 
from using courts for any purpose (except to apply for reinstatement), 
and loses the right to retain its corporate name.117 A dissolved 
corporation, once its affairs have been wound up, simply ceases to 
of the federal Constitution and similar provisions of the California Constitution"). 
112 Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939). 
113 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 (1978) (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,535 (1925)). 
114 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.l4 ("Certain 'purely personal' 
guarantees ... are unavailable to corporations and other organizations because the 'historic function' 
of the particular guarantee has been limited to the protection of individuals .... Whether or not a 
particular guarantee is 'purely personal' or is unavailable to corporations for some other reason 
depends on the nature, history, and purpose of the particular constitutional provision.") (citing 
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-701 (1944)); see Jed S. Rakoff, Coerced Waiver of 
Corporate Privilege, 7/13/95 N.V. LJ. 3 at col.l (July 13, 1995) ("The fundamental reason why a 
company is entitled to the protections of the attorney-client privilege but not to those of the privilege 
against self-incrimination is that 'the [attorney-client] privilege does not exist out of deference to any 
personal right, but rather ... to facilitate the workings of justice. "') (citing Radiant Burners Inc. v. 
Am. Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 321 (7th Cir. 1963)). 
115 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am, 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) ("A corporation is an 
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere 
creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, 
either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence") (citing Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward, 17 U.S. 518,636 (1918)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
116 See 16A Fletcher Cyclopedia Corp. § 7997 (2007) ("[A]II jurisdictions require 
corporations to file either annual or biennial reports. Most states also require the annual payment of 
franchise taxes or license fees. If a corporation fails to comply with these requirements for a 
specified period of time after they become due, the state usually has authority to administratively 
suspend its activities and to dissolve the corporation without obtaining a judicial order. This is 
known as administrative dissolution .... "); see, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 2205. 
117 See, e.g., 9 B.E.WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Corporations § 75, at 845 (10th 
ed.2005). 
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exist. 118 In other words, corporations do not enjoy a constitutional right 
to their continued existence or means of livelihood; thus, the Garrity 
analysis does not apply. 
Second, the Garrity analogy fails because unlike the officers in 
Garrity, corporations exchange their waivers for a specific benefit: 
reduced risk of indictment. In Garrity, the officers had a choice between 
the status quo of job retention and the penalty of job loss. The officers 
did not gain any advantage by waiving their privileges against self-
incrimination; they merely avoided being forced into a worse position. 
On the other hand, the status quo for a corporation being investigated by 
the government is a risk of indictment. Corporations waive their 
attorney-client privilege in exchange for a reduction of that risk, thereby 
moving themselves into a better position. Furthermore, the penalties in 
Garrity were statutorily compelled and certain to occur, whereas an 
indictment does not legally compel the dissolution of a corporation. 119 
Though the reputational consequences of an indictment may affect a 
corporation's value, indictment will not necessarily result in the financial 
destruction of the company.120 
For example, Reliant Energy was indicted in 2004 for alleged price-
fixing during the 2001 California energy crisis. Since its indictment, 
Reliant Energy's stock has continued to rise steadily from approximately 
$5 a share in 2004 to around $25 a share in 2007. 121 However, Reliant 
experienced a significant drop in stock value from 2001 when the first 
118 Although it is true that corporate employees may lose their jobs if a corporation dissolves, 
their rights are not at issue here, as they are not holders of the attorney-client privilege, nor are they 
being directly "threatened" by the DOJ. This does however, bring up the issue of "delegated 
coercion"; i.e., to cooperate, the corporation does an internal investigation, legally requiring its 
employees to respond to its questions on pain of job loss; the corporation then turns over employee 
statements to the government. The argument is that "when corporations themselves are compelling 
employee statements, but doing so at the behest of the government, the government's wrongful 
threat is delegated." Lisa K. Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal 
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 311, 358-65 (2007). The solution for this problem may be "for 
corporations and the government to recognize employees' rights during the corporate investigatory 
phase ... and to have counsel present during their interviews by corporation counsel." Marvin G. 
Pickholz & Jason R. Pickholz, Investigations Put Employees in Tough Spot, Are 'Cooperating' 
Corporations Violating Constitutional Rights?, 236 N.Y.L.J. 10 (Col. 4) (July 24,2006). 
119 Peter Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate Crime, Advancement oj Executives' DeJense 
Costs, and the Federal Courts (Part If), 7 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.1. 2 (2006), available at 
http://blj.ucdavis.edularticle.asp?id=650. 
120 1d. 
121 See NASDAQ Stock Market Charts for Reliant Energy (RRI) with 10-year time frame, 
http://quotes.nasdaq.comlquote.dll?page=charting&mode=basics&intraday=off&timeframe= I Oy&ch 
arttype=ohlc&splits=off&earnings=off&movingaverage=None&lowerstudy=volume&comparison= 
off&index=&drilldown=off&symbol=RRI&selected=RRI (last visited March 4, 2008). 
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allegations of wrongdoing were made public,122 and its stock continued 
to drop until 2003 when the company reached settlements with the 
investigating agencies. 123 This kind of result apparently is quite 
common. Empirical studies show significant declines in reported 
earnings occur in the year of the announced allegation of misconduct. 124 
On average, firms lose forty-one percent of their market value when 
news of the misconduct is revealed. 125 Damage to the share value of the 
company is done long before indictment: the first publicly announced 
allegations of illegal activities do the most harm to the company's 
reputation and value. 
An indictment will, however, adversely affect the charged party. At 
the very least, any accused is likely to suffer reputational damage and the 
financial costs of defense. However, "the distinction between economic 
harm that is foreseeable in the marketplace and harm that is legally 
required by the state" places the waiver of the attorney-client privilege 
issue outside of the Garrity rule. 126 
122 See James F. Peltz, Power Suppliers' Stocks Fall Under Strain of Public Attack, Wall 
Street: Analysts are split on whether lower prices make for a good opportunity to buy shares now, 
Los ANGELES TIMES, June 14,2001, available at 2001 WLNR 10567770 ("The [power] companies' 
stocks are taking a beating lately from public allegations that these unregulated electricity and 
natural-gas providers are unfairly exploiting California's power crisis for their bottom lines."). 
123 1d. The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) were investigating Reliant Energy prior to its indictment by the DOJ. See 
Reliant Resources Inc.: SEC issues investigation order regarding 'round trip' trades, WALL ST. J. 
(U.S. Edition), June 21, 2002, available at 2002 WLNR 3280917; To move beyond Western 
investigations, Reliant settles, INSIDE FERC, Oct. 6,2003, available at 2003 WLNR 3216953. 
124 Deborah Murphy, Ronald E. Shrieves, and Samuel L. Tibbs, Understanding the Penalties 
Associated With Corporate Misconduct: An Empirical Examination of Earnings and Risk, JOURNAL 
OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, manuscript at 2-3, 
http://www.corpgovcenter.org/ResearchiDetShrMurTib.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2008). 
125 1d. at 4. For example, McKesson HBOC lost $9 billion in shareholder value when its 
accounting fraud scheme was disclosed. Second Year Report to the President, Corporate Fraud Task 
Force at 3.8 (2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftfl2ndJr3raud_report.pdf. Mercury Finance 
Company was not indicted; however, its Treasurer was charged with wire fraud and bank fraud in 
connection with a scheme to fraudulently inflate income and receivables while underreporting loan 
delinquencies. When the fraud was discovered, the company's stock value dropped from around 
fifteen dollars per share to approximately two dollars per share, representing a market capitalization 
loss of over $2 billion. Id. at 3.10. Dynegy's former Senior Director of Tax Planning/International 
Tax and Vice President of Finance was sentenced to more than twenty-four years for his role in a 
corporate fraud scheme. When the fraud was publicly disclosed, Dynegy's stock fell fifty-two 
percent in two days. Id. at 3.14. The former chairman and vice-chairman of Cendant Corp. were 
found guilty of conspiracy and securities fraud arising out of an accounting fraud scheme. When the 
fraud was made public, Cendant suffered a market capitalization loss of $14 billion in one day. 
Department of Justice, Fact Sheet: President's Corporate Fraud Task Force Marks Five years of 
Ensuring Corporate Integrity (July 17, 2007), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opalpr/2007/July/07_odag...507.html. 
126 Peter Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate Crime, Advancement of Executives' Defense 
Costs, and the Federal Courts (Part /I), 7 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 2 (2006), available at 
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3. The Legal Standard for Coerced Plea Bargains 
The cooperation required by the DOJ to avoid indictment follows 
the long common-law history of rewarding a witness who is an accessory 
to a crime with leniency in exchange for giving information against 
another defendant. 127 A corporation can be held vicariously liable for the 
actions of its directors, officers, and employees if they were acting within 
the scope of their employment and for the benefit of the corporation.128 
In exchange for cooperation, including, if necessary, disclosing 
privileged information the corporation has regarding the criminal acts of 
its employees, the DOJ may offer the corporation leniency in the form of 
no indictment. Whether viewed as an offer of leniency or its natural 
inverse - a threat of indictment - this type of exchange has become 
integral to our criminal justice system and does not constitute 
. 129 coercIOn. 
For example, in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the Supreme Court 
validated a prosecutor's threat to pursue more severe charges if the 
defendant did not accept a plea agreement. The Court reasoned that the 
prosecutor "no more than openly presented the defendant with the 
unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he 
was plainly subject to prosecution.,,130 Similarly, in Brady v. United 
http://blj.ucdavis.edu/article.asp?id=650. 
127 Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and "Good Corporate 
Citizenship, " 76 Sr. JOHN'S L. REv. 979, 979 (2002) ("Judicial leniency for cooperators traces its 
roots back hundreds of years to the common law practice of approvement, and American prosecutors 
have been striking deals with cooperators since at least the nineteenth century."); see United States 
v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1301 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 
F.2d 310,315 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Juncal, 1998 WL 525800 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 
("The concept of affording cooperating accomplices with leniency dates back to the common law in 
England and has been recognized and approved by the United States Congress, the United States 
Courts and the United States Sentencing Commission."). 
128 See, e.g., Stephanie A. Martz, The Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, 31-
May CHAMPION 40 (2007) ("Since the Supreme Court's 1909 decision in New York Central & 
Hudson R,R, v, United States, [212 U.s, 481 (1909),) corporations have been vicariously liable for 
the actions of their employees."); Memorandum of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., United 
States Dep't of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (2003) at 13, 
cmt, B, http://www,usdoj,gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo,pdf (citing United States v, Basic 
Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570 (4th Cir, 1983) ("[A) corporation may be held criminally responsible for 
antitrust violations committed by its employees if they were acting within the scope of their 
authority, or apparent authority, and for the benefit of the corporation, even if, , , such acts were 
against corporate policy or express instructions."». 
129 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U,S, 357, 364 (1978) ("Defendants advised by competent 
counsel and protected by other procedural safeguards are presumptively capable of intelligent choice 
in response to prosecutorial persuasion, , ,."); Santobello v, New York, 404 U,S, 257, 260-61 
(1971 ), 
130 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. at 365, 
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States, the Court rejected petitioner's assertion that his plea bargain had 
been coerced by the threat of capital punishment, by the prosecutor's 
offer of leniency, and by pressure from his attorney to accept the plea. 131 
The Court held that as long as petitioner pleaded guilty with full 
knowledge of the direct consequences of his plea, the plea was voluntary 
unless it was induced by threats, misrepresentations, or improper 
promises. 132 
Corporate waiver of the privilege to avoid the risk of serious costs 
and consequences associated with indictment can be analogized to plea 
bargains made by criminal defendants to avoid the risk of a capital 
sentence. 133 Through plea bargains, criminal defendants waive 
constitutional rights such as the privilege against self-incrimination, the 
right to a jury trial, and the right to confront one's accusers in exchange 
for a lesser charge or punishment. 134 A plea of guilty is itself a 
conviction, it is conclusive, and "the court has nothing to do but give 
judgment and sentence.,,135 
In spite of the significant sacrifice an accused makes in a plea 
bargain, the Supreme Court acknowledges that this aspect of the criminal 
justice system is entirely acceptable, and "an essential component of the 
administration of justice.,,136 The Court embraces plea bargaining 
because it helps both defendants and prosecutors by allowing each to 
avoid the expense and risks of trial. 137 As in Garrity, a prosecutor cannot 
131 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 743 (1970). 
132 /d. at 755 ("(A) plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, 
including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own 
counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), 
misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are 
by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. 
bribes)."). 
I33 See Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and "Good Corporate 
Citizenship," 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 979, 981 n.9 (2002) (citing Lynn Cowan & Cheryl Winokur 
Munk, Anderson: Called to Account: Criminal Charges Threaten Auditor's Survival, WALL ST. 1., 
MAR. 18, 2002, at col. 15 ("In the past two decades, no financial-services firm has remained in 
business after facing criminal charges."». 
134 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 748. 
m Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962) (citing Kercheval v. United States, 
274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927». 
136 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). For example, in 2006, 95.7% of 
successfully prosecuted criminal cases resulted from a guilty plea while only 4.3% had gone to trial. 
United States Sentencing Comm'n 2006 Annual Report at 34 (2006), 
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPTI2006/chap5_06.pdf. 
137 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 
742, 752 (1970»; see Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. at 260 ("If every criminal charge were 
subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by 
many times the number of judges and court facilities."); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 
(1977) ("The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration ... gains a speedy disposition of his 
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vindictively punish a defendant for asserting a right such as his right to 
trial,138 but a prosecutor can offer the benefit of leniency in exchange for 
cooperation because "in the 'give-and-take' of plea bargaining, there is 
no such element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is 
free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer.,,139 Furthennore, courts 
presume that a defendant anned with advice from competent counsel and 
procedural protections can make an intelligent decision in the face of 
prosecutorial persuasion. 140 
The same principles can be applied in the corporate context. 
Corporations and prosecutors both benefit from the exchange of 
cooperation for leniency. Prosecutors receive valuable infonnation that 
helps them conserve resources, and corporations can avoid the 
reputational costs and uncertain results of an indictment. Like a criminal 
defendant who chooses to go to trial rather than accept a plea bargain, a 
corporation can refuse to waive its attorney-client privilege and take the 
chance that it may be indicted. The corporation is free to accept or reject 
the government's offer of leniency in exchange for cooperation. In other 
words, the offer does not coerce cooperation. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Trammel v. United States supports 
this analogy. 141 In Trammel, a wife chose to waive her testimonial 
marital privilege and testify against her husband in exchange for a grant 
of immunity and assurances of leniency. The Court held that these 
proffered benefits did not render her testimony involuntary. 142 Similarly, 
although the coercion issue has not been considered specifically, lower 
federal courts have shown little sympathy for the tough decision 
corporations may be faced with when under investigation by the DOJ, 
case, ... and a prompt start in realizing whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges 
and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources. The public is protected from the risks posed by 
those charged with criminal offenses who are at large on bail while awaiting completion of criminal 
proceedings. "). 
138 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. at 363 ("To punish a person because he has done what 
the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort, ... and for an 
agent of the State to pursue a course of action whose objective is to penalize a person's reliance on 
his legal rights is 'patently unconstitutional. "') (citing Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32-33 
n.20 (1973». 
139 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. at 363; see id. at 364 ("[T]he imposition of these 
difficult choices [is] an inevitable - and permissible - attribute of any legitimate system which 
tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas."); see also United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 
330, 363 (S.D. N.Y. 2006) ("No one disputes the proposition that a willingness to cooperate with the 
government is an appropriate consideration in deciding whether to charge an entity."); 22 C.J.S. 
Criminal Law § 487 ("[T]he promise of a recommendation of a lenient sentence and the consequent 
fear ofa greater penalty upon conviction after trial does not render the plea involuntary."). 
140 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 758. 
141 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980). 
142 [d. at 53. 
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finding it an insufficient reason to create an exception to the waiver 
doctrine. 143 
This is not to say that waivers of rights and privileges can never be 
coerced. For example, a guilty plea may be found involuntary if the 
accused has been induced to enter it by deception, unfulfilled promises, 
misrepresentations, unethical threats, or improper promises not related to 
the prosecutor's business or the case at hand, such as bribes and third-
party promises. 144 Thus, to continue the analogy to corporate waivers, if 
a prosecutor promised to refrain from indicting a corporation if the 
corporation waived its privileges, and then indicted the corporation 
anyway, the waiver could be deemed involuntary. However, regardless 
of the financial effects an indictment may have upon a corporation, no 
matter how onerous the decision to assert the privilege may be, a mere 
threat of indictment when properly made cannot be construed to coerce a 
waiver of a corporation's attorney-client privilege, when that waiver is 
given knowingly and intelligently and/or upon advice of counsel. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Neither the DOJ's general policy of considering waiver of the 
privilege in its charging decisions, nor the pressure to waive the privilege 
that prosecutors may apply, rises to the level of coercion. At all times, 
the corporation has a choice. Based upon a weighing of its financial 
interests, and upon the advice of experienced counsel, a corporation may 
or may not choose to waive its privilege. This may be a difficult choice, 
but it is a choice nonetheless, and it is the same kind of choice individual 
criminal defendants face every day. 
This is not to say that corporate coercion could never occur. 
However, coercion requires a wrongful act or serious error. For 
example, a corporation could be coerced if a court erroneously orders 
disclosure of privileged information after the corporation has asserted its 
privilege; if a prosecutor makes a baseless and wrongful threat of 
indictment to obtain the waiver; or if a prosecutor fails to keep a promise 
made in exchange for the waiver. 
Finding that the threat of indictment alone is sufficient to coerce a 
143 See In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Whether characterized 
as forcing a party in between a Scylla and Charybdis, a rock and a hard place, or some other tired but 
equally evocative metaphoric cliche, the 'Hobson's choice' argument is unpersuasive given the facts 
of this case. An allegation that a party facing a federal investigation and the prospect of a civil fraud 
suit must make difficult choices is insufficient justification for carving a substantial exception to the 
waiver doctrine."). 
144 Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509 (1984); 21 AM. JUR. 2d Criminal Law § 686; 22 
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 487. 
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corporate waiver requires one of two results: (1) either corporations 
accused of criminal activity are to be treated with more sensitivity than 
individual criminal defendants who also suffer the collateral impacts of 
indictment; or (2) threat of indictment must also be treated as coercing 
individual waivers. Neither result works. The former suggests, 
illogically, that corporations, in spite of the sophistication of their 
officers, directors and corporate counsel, are somehow more susceptible 
to coercion than an individual defendant facing criminal charges. The 
latter breaks down our entire system of criminal justice, as plea bargains 
and settlements become improper per se and every defendant who 
waived a right in exchange for leniency may claim coercion. 
The proper source of protection for the corporate attorney-client 
privilege is the legislature. Policymakers may decide that corporate 
disclosures of privileged information to government agents are of 
sufficient value to society to warrant creating an exception to the waiver 
doctrine. Such legislation is currently pending. The proposed Attorney-
Client Privilege Act of 2007 would prevent the DO] from including a 
corporation's waiver of the privilege as an element of cooperation. In· 
the meantime, courts should not treat corporations with favoritism by 
allowing these sophisticated parties to claim that a threat of indictment is 
sufficient to coerce their actions. 
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